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THE TRANSMISSION OF FOREIGN FINANCIAL 
CRISES TO SOUTH AFRICA:  
A FIRM-LEVEL STUDY 
 
W H Boshoff* 
 
 
Abstract 
 
he process of financial integration has increased the exposure of 
South African financial markets to foreign financial crises.  This 
paper contributes to the understanding of crisis transmission by 
evaluating several hypotheses that claim to explain how financial 
crises are transmitted to South African financial markets.  The study 
proceeds from a firm-level perspective, which it argues overcomes 
the potential loss of information when using aggregate economic 
data.  Consequently, the different transmission hypotheses are 
evaluated for the East Asian, Russian and Argentinean crises using 
firm-level daily stock return data from the JSE Securities Exchange.  
A multivariate regression model, supplemented by sensitivity tests, 
forms the core of the empirical methodology.  
 
1. Introduction 
 
The financial integration of recent decades has had important benefits for emerging 
economies, but has also been associated with increased financial turbulence.  South 
Africa has been no exception, with local financial markets severely affected by 
financial crises over the past ten years.  These crises have motivated economists to 
study the dynamics and underlying causes of financial crises.  This paper makes a 
modest contribution to this on-going academic project by investigating possible 
reasons for crisis transmission to South African financial markets from a firm-level 
perspective.  It does so bearing in mind that the complexity of the crisis 
phenomenon requires extensive analysis and that the majority of studies are based 
on methodological approaches that differ from the one adopted in this paper.  
Nonetheless, it is argued that the results from this study may supplement the 
existing literature to help explain how financial crises are transmitted to the South 
African economy at large.  In particular, the firm-level study of crisis transmission 
in this paper may offer an advantage over the use of aggregate statistics on account 
of the loss of information during compilation of national accounts.   
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The specific goal of the paper is an empirical investigation of the channels of crisis 
transmission during the East Asian, Russian and Argentinean crises by means of a 
multivariate statistical analysis.  Prior to this, the concept of “financial crisis” is 
given precise meaning and the possible channels of crisis transmission are 
discussed briefly.  
 
2. Identifying financial crises 
 
Over the past two decades, financial markets have become increasingly integrated.  
This is evident from increased institutional investment activity across nations, 
increased cross-border financing of mergers and acquisitions and a general 
relocation of financial risks by banks from their balance sheets to the security 
markets (Häusler, 2002).  Given this increased integration, it is possible that 
country-specific financial crises, under particular conditions, may be transmitted to 
foreign financial markets.  An investigation of crisis transmission, however, 
requires a clear distinction between contagious and non-contagious crises.   
 
Depending on the size and speed of the impact of a particular financial crisis on 
foreign financial markets, two types of financial crisis can be identified.  A 
contagious crisis is an event in a particular country that has a significant and 
immediate impact on markets in other countries – a process commonly termed 
financial contagion.  Transmission, therefore, is “fast and furious” (Kaminsky, 
Reinhart and Vegh, 2003: 3-4).  On the other hand, non-contagious crises are crises 
to which initial outside market reaction is slow and limited – even though, over a 
longer time period, the impact on outside markets may be large (Kaminsky, 
Reinhart and Vegh, 2003: 3-4).  Although non-contagious crises have spillover 
effects, these do not initiate financial contagion.   
 
Table 1 categorizes the major financial crises of the past decade.  Note that the 
Brazilian crisis is included as a separate crisis event, even though it is related to the 
Russian crisis of the previous year (IMF, 1998: 30).  This is due to similar problems 
of excessive external finance requirements, massive fiscal deficits and a shortening 
of public debt maturity periods.  Additionally, the rise in international interest rates 
(following the Russian default) created unsustainable pressure on the Brazilian 
treasury (IMF, 1998: 30).  
 
The international literature suggests two stylised facts useful in the identification of 
financial crises (both contagious and non-contagious): firstly, the size of capital 
flows to and from crisis markets and, secondly, the extent to which the pending 
disaster is anticipated.   
 
As far as the size of capital flows are concerned, the contagious Mexican, East 
Asian and Russian crises seemed to occur during periods of increased international 
capital flows to emerging markets.  The Brazilian, Turkish and Argentinean crises 
(all of which did not initiate contagion according to the definition in this paper) 
occurred during periods of lower levels of international capital flows to emerging 
economies (Kaminsky, Reinhart and Vegh, 2003: 13).   
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Table 1: Examples of contagious and non-contagious crises 
 
Contagious crises Non-contagious crises 
Crisis Year Crisis Year 
Mexico 1994 Brazil 1999 
East Asia 1997 Argentine 2001 
Russia 1998 Turkey 2002 
Source: Own analysis from Forbes (2000)   
 
 
With regard to the second classifying feature, it appears that broadly anticipated 
crises do not spread to other countries (Kaminsky, Reinhart and Vegh, 2003: 17).  
Argentinean credit ratings (a measure of crisis expectations) prior to and during the 
Argentinean crisis show large downward adjustments at short intervals – in contrast 
with the slower, smaller downgrades of ratings for Thailand and Russia (IMF, 
1998: 17) prior to the East Asian and Russian crises respectively. 
 
3. Channels of crisis transmission 
 
Within this conceptual framework, several “transmission channels” have been 
proposed to explain how financial crises are transmitted (Forbes, 2001).  Such 
transmission channels can be organised into three categories, namely trade 
linkages, financial linkages and linkages based on investor behaviour – each group 
offering a distinct explanation of why crises are transmitted across national borders.   
 
Trade and financial linkages, as explained in the following paragraphs, constitute 
market-driven transmission linkages in the sense that crisis transmission is brought 
about by the discipline of market forces.  However, an alternative body of theory 
explains the propagation of crises by reference to investor behaviour, rather than 
the functioning of markets.  Due to the difficulty in testing such psychological 
phenomenon, this paper is restricted to testing for the plausibility of trade and 
financial linkages.  Further elaboration on this fast expanding field is, therefore, not 
attempted.   
 
3.1 Trade linkages 
 
The first group of linkages that may explain the propagation of financial crises 
across borders are termed trade linkages.  These can be further decomposed into 
two different sub-channels: the competition linkage and the domestic demand 
linkage.   
 
The trade effect brought about by the competition sub-linkage occurs when a crisis 
country, following domestic financial problems, experiences either currency 
depreciation (within a floating exchange rate regime) or opts for devaluation of its 
currency (within a fixed exchange rate regime).  The devaluation or depreciation 
reduces the export competitiveness of the countries with which it competes in so-
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called third markets (Dornbusch, Park and Claessens, 2000: 180).  This puts 
pressure on prices internationally – if the crisis country’s exports in a particular 
production category are large enough. Put differently, other countries need not even 
compete with the crisis country in order for their export competitiveness to 
deteriorate (Forbes, 2001: 14).   
 
The trade effects of financial crises are not limited to competition issues though, as 
domestic demand represents a second trade sub-linkage.  A domestic financial 
crisis may affect local demand for imported goods, which will further affect nations 
exporting to the crisis country (Wincoop and Yi, 2000).  However, the domestic 
demand linkage need not necessarily imply an adverse effect over longer periods 
(Forbes, 2001: 14).   In the months and years following the crisis, if the currency 
depreciation or devaluation improves exports and general growth performance, the 
domestic demand effect could be positive (Gupta et al, 2000).  
 
Disagreement exists on the importance of trade in the propagation of crises.  
Empirical evidence remains inconclusive on the matter – with definitional aspects 
usually to blame for contradicting results.  Glick and Rose (1999: 613) (using 
aggregate data) and Forbes (2000) (using firm-level data) find evidence that trade 
effects are important in the transmission of financial crises.  Baig and Goldfajn 
(1998) as well as Kaminsky and Reinhart (2003) disagree, pointing to the weak 
trade relations between nations affected by foreign crises (such as Hong Kong or 
Eastern Europe) and the original crisis country (in this case Thailand and Russia, 
respectively).   
 
These conflicting findings have resulted in an intermediate view on the importance 
of trade in spreading contagion.  Claessens and Forbes (2000) argue that studies 
limited to a particular linkage group, say trade linkages, experience problems with 
omitted-variable bias – as linkages are usually highly correlated and difficult to 
disentangle.  They favour an inclusive approach that acknowledges the importance 
of all linkages – which includes, but is not limited to, trade. 
 
3.2 Financial linkages 
 
The difficulty in disentangling trade and financial linkages is illustrated by research 
conducted by Hernández and Valdés (2001: 5) who explain the transmission of 
contagion through financial linkages.  They find that devaluation crises could also 
be propagated through financial linkages.  For example, East Asian firms with Thai 
investments suffered losses with the devaluation of the Thai baht during 1997.  This 
had adverse effects on stock prices outside of Thailand – which helped spread the 
crisis internationally (Dornbusch, Park and Claessens, 2000: 181).  Financial 
linkages, therefore, form a second group of linkages that could explain crisis 
transmission.  Similar to trade linkages, these linkages are also subdivided into two 
sub-channels: the credit linkage and the portfolio re-composition linkage.   
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3.2.1 Credit linkage 
 
Goldfajn and Valdés (1997) were among the first to argue that financial institutions, 
when adversely affected by deposit withdrawals during a crisis, may liquidate loans 
to foreigners in order to maintain sufficient liquidity.  Commercial banking 
provides supporting evidence in this regard.  Prior to the East Asian financial 
market turmoil, countries affected by the Thai crisis formed sixty-five percent of 
the emerging market loans portfolio for Japanese banks and twenty-three percent of 
the portfolio for European banks.  American banks, on the other hand, were much 
less exposed to East Asia.   
 
These figures must be seen in light of the strong growth in international bank 
lending to East Asian countries – amounting to an annual increase of approximately 
US$40 billion for the period from 1994 to 1997.   The famous Asian carry trade, by 
which international financial institutions borrowed in dollar and re-invested in 
short-term Thai debt instruments, played a significant role in the growth of bank 
lending to East Asia (OECD 1998).  Following the demise of the Thai currency, 
these banks cut credit extension to East Asian companies – resulting in withdrawal 
of capital to the amount of US$47 billion (Kaminsky, Reinhart and Vegh, 2003: 
19).  A similar story plays out in the Russian case – Russia accounted for twenty 
percent of emerging market credit provided by German banks prior to the crisis 
(Kaminsky, Reinhart and Vegh, 2003: 20). 
 
The proposition of a “credit crunch” (as this sub-channel is also known) is, 
however, not undisputed.  Evidence on loan rationing following the East Asian 
crisis is contradicting.  Kim (1999) finds significant evidence, while Ghosh and 
Ghosh (1999) do not find supporting results – both using similar methodologies. 
 
3.2.2 Portfolio recomposition linkage 
 
A closely related financial sub-linkage is that of portfolio recomposition.  The 
theory holds that, during a financial crisis in a particular country, leveraged 
investors suffering adverse price movements in a particular asset will be faced by 
margin calls from clearinghouses.   In order for them to pay the maintenance 
margin, the investors will be forced to sell some asset holdings (Kaminsky, 
Reinhart and Vegh, 2003: 7).  The strategy, however, will be to sell assets other 
than those whose prices have already collapsed (that is, portfolios will be re-
constituted).  Suppose that the assets to be sold are from countries other than the 
one in crisis.  Due to information asymmetries, the markets will not be able to 
distinguish between the countries in crisis and those not (Biekpe and Collins, 2003: 
183).  A sell-off to meet margin calls will therefore cause markets to punish 
countries other than the one in crisis – driving down asset prices in these countries 
and spreading the initial crisis across markets.   
 
The importance of a portfolio recomposition channel in crisis transmission can be 
measured by the extent of liquidity in the particular market.  Portfolio 
recomposition should, arguably, occur in markets that are fairly liquid (as measured 
by market breadth and depth).  Liquidity was far greater for markets in Taiwan, 
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Singapore and Hong Kong than in other East Asian nations; a similar argument 
holds for Brazil in the context of Latin America (Kaminsky, Lyons and Schmukler, 
2003).  This may explain why these nations suffered the greatest withdrawals of 
mutual fund investment following the Thai and Mexican crises respectively.   
 
4. Empirical methodology and data 
 
The hypotheses of trade and financial linkages as explanations for the transmission 
of foreign financial crises to South Africa can be formally tested within a statistical 
model.  This section describes the methodology employed in testing these 
hypotheses for both contagious crises (the Asian and Russian cases) as well as for a 
non-contagious crisis (the Argentinean case).   
 
The assignment of a specific duration and dates to each crisis is arbitrary and 
subject to scrutiny (see Table 2 for the duration of different crises).  This study 
follows the same period and dates for the Asian and Russian crisis as constructed 
by Forbes (2000), while the author’s interpretation is used in determining the 
Argentinean crisis duration and dates.  Alternative durations and dates are 
considered in the sensitivity tests that follow in Section 6. 
 
 
Table 2: Duration of different crises 
 
Crisis Duration 
Asian Crisis Phase 1 25 June 1997 - 16 September 1997 
Asian Crisis Phase 2 1 October 1997 - 24 December 1997 
Russian Crisis 17 August 1998 - 31 August 1998 
Argentinean Crisis 30 November 2001 - 31 December 2001 
 
 
The Asian crisis is subdivided into two phases.  The first phase represents the 
period during which lower-income countries in East Asia (notably Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines) suffered currency crises.  This was initiated 
on 25 June 1997 when the Thai government refused to guarantee the solvency of an 
important financial institution and acknowledged a lack of sufficient reserves to 
maintain its fixed exchange rate regime.  The second phase represents the period 
during which higher-income countries were hit by the financial turmoil.   
 
The Russian crisis is dated as starting on 17 August 1998 when the government 
devalued the currency, defaulted on its treasury bills and imposed a ninety-day 
moratorium on foreign debt payments.  The date of 30 November 2001 is used as 
the start of the Argentinean crisis in what had probably been a “semi-crisis” for a 
considerable period beforehand.  On this date a run on Argentinean banks ensued, 
with central bank reserves plummeting by $2 billion on that day.  Also, on that day, 
Argentinean president De la Rua announced a withdrawal limitation of $1000 on 
personal bank accounts.   
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4.1 The firm-level approach 
 
The analysis employed here follows a similar study undertaken by Kristin Forbes 
(2000) at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.  Forbes utilizes firm-level data 
from over 10 000 companies in 46 countries to identify how international crises are 
transmitted and which type of companies are most affected by them.  She tests for 
competition, domestic demand, credit and portfolio re-composition channels during 
the East Asian and Russian crises.  The results in the coming sections will be 
compared with her findings.   
 
Forbes concludes that the origin of a particular company offers an important 
explanation of how the company will react to crises and argues that country-
specific effects (as Forbes terms this phenomenon) can have a bigger impact than 
all of the transmission channels combined (see the abstract from Forbes (2000)).  
This provides the motivation for pursuing a study limited to the firms of a particular 
country – in this case, South Africa. 
 
4.2 The data set 
 
The McGregor BFA database is used to construct the firm-level data set.  Data is 
obtained from income statements and balance sheets as well as general company 
information of thirty-two South African companies (primarily contained in the 
FTSE JSE Top 40 index of the largest 40 companies listed on the JSE Securities 
Exchange of South Africa) and is combined with daily stock returns.  A list of the 
companies is provided in the Appendix.  Companies are excluded from the data set 
on the basis of data anomalies as well as merger or unbundling activities. 
 
Two potential concerns may arise when drawing inferences from a firm-level data 
set.  The first is related to the exclusion of publicly owned firms as well as smaller 
firms on the JSE Securities Exchange.  The second concern is the problem of 
accounting standards (Forbes 2000: 12).  This concern, however, should not apply 
to this data set as all firms in the sample are listed on a single stock exchange where 
all companies are obliged to comply with accounting practices set by the JSE 
Securities Exchange SA (see Van Zyl and Gidlow, 2003: 289-295).   
 
4.3 Channel dummy variables 
 
For the econometric analysis a mathematical formulation is required for each of the 
four channels of crisis transmission.  The competition channel hypothesis states that 
a crisis country with a depreciating currency will see its exports gain a competitive 
advantage.  From a South African viewpoint, local firms competing with exports 
from the crisis country will see their share prices drop as investors anticipate the 
loss in local competitive advantage vis-à-vis the crisis country.  The impact of this 
channel can be measured by identifying “major exports” – defined as goods and 
services in which crisis countries hold more than twenty percent of total 
international exports.  A dummy variable is then constructed to identify all South 
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African firms competing with these major exports1.  It should be noted that imports 
might also be utilized to measure the competition channel, although this is less 
common in the literature. 
  
Major exports for the Asian and Russian cases are identified using the SIC 
(Standard International Classification) analysis by Forbes (2000: 16 and 53).  In the 
Argentinean case, information from the International Monetary Fund and the World 
Bank are utilized.  The problem with the Argentinean case is lack of access to up-
to-date disaggregated export information; the classification in this case is proximate 
and subject to data quality and other definitional problems.  
 
The hypothesis for the second channel, domestic demand, states that a financial 
crisis in a country reduces the profitability of companies operating in that country.  
Unfortunately, lack of region-specific (or even continent-specific) data prevent 
testing of this channel.  Moreover, the domestic demand and competition channels 
may not be truly independent in the South African case.  For example, in the 
Russian crisis, South African firms competing against mining exports may also 
have operations in Russia.  In light of this potential danger, the exclusion of the 
domestic demand channel is problematic, but probably not devastating.   
 
The third hypothesis of crisis transmission is the credit channel through which 
lenders in the crisis country are forced to liquidate loans made to foreigners, due to 
large deposit withdrawals.  This implies that firms relying more heavily on short-
term debt should be more vulnerable to a crisis.  To test this channel, the ratio of 
net short-term debt to equity is used to construct a dummy variable to distinguish 
between those more and those less dependent on short-term financing.  
 
The hypothesis of the portfolio re-composition channel holds that, after a crisis, 
investors may sell investments in markets not directly affected by a financial crisis 
so as to meet margin calls.  The firm-level data set, as Forbes (2000: 19) notes, 
cannot be used directly to test for this.  However, Falkenstein (1996) argues that 
investors prefer more liquid stocks.  Now, if liquid stocks have a higher proportion 
of institutional owners, then highly liquid stocks may be affected by a portfolio re-
composition.  Share liquidity is defined as the amount of shares traded as a 
proportion of shares outstanding.  A dummy variable is then constructed to separate 
highly and less liquid shares. 
 
5. Multivariate analysis  
 
The standard market returns model (Sharpe 1963) is used throughout the 
multivariate analysis.  All results are obtained via the R statistical programming 
language (2003).  The model is first estimated for the pre-crisis period: 
 
it i i mt itR α β R ε= + +  … (1) 
                                                        
1 For example, mining companies will be the most important South African companies competing with 
large Russian and Argentinean mineral exports, while the SA conglomerates are the most important 
companies competing with the main East Asian exports.   
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where 
 
E ( itε ) = 0 ; var ( itε )= 
2
itεσ ; i = 1,…,N ; t = 1,…,P  
 
and where 
 
itR  is the day t return for stock i, mtR  is the day t market return, itε  is the 
disturbance for stock i over day t and the model is calculated for N firms and P 
days, where P refers to the number of pre-crisis days. 
 
The component i i mtα β R+  in (1) represents that part of the return that can be 
systematically explained by the return on the market, while the component itε  is 
the random part representing the part of the return unique to the security (Blake, 
2003: 484).  This unsystematic component ( itε ) is the main concern, as this study 
aims to test the potential of channel dummy variables (which depend on company 
characteristics) to explain the transmission of financial crises.   Consequently, the 
parameters iα and iβ  in (1) are estimated for the pre-crisis period (denoted by iαˆ  
and iβˆ ) and then used to calculate the excess returns ( itεˆ ) for the crisis period: 
 
it it i i mt
ˆˆ ˆε R α β R= − −  … (2) 
 
for  t = P+1,…,P+C ;  where C is the duration of the crisis in days.  
 
The study then tests whether the different transmission channels (as defined 
previously) explain a significant portion of the variation in the excess returns 
during a crisis period.  This takes the form of a second regression of the excess 
returns (from (2)) on the channel dummy variables measuring the exposure of each 
firm to the crisis transmission channels (Forbes, 2000: 22).  There is one twist 
however – in order to obtain only a single estimate for the coefficients, the vector 
of average excess returns is used (Forbes, 2000: 23): 
 
εˆ F θ ν= +  … (3) 
 
where 
 
P C
i it
t P 1
ˆ ˆ
+
=
= +
ε ε∑  is the average excess return for firm i during the crisis 
period 
1 2 N
ˆ ˆ ˆˆ , ,...,⎡ ⎤′ = ε ε ε⎣ ⎦ε  is the 1 × N vector of these average excess returns for 
each firm during the crisis period 
F   is the N × K matrix of dummy variables 
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θ  is the K × 1 parameter vector  
ν  is the N × 1 stochastic vector of disturbances assumed 
to be normally distributed 
 
The above specification is estimated as a multivariate regression model – allowing 
equation-by-equation ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation (Johnson and 
Wichern, 2002: 384).  However, Forbes (2000: 23) argues that OLS estimates are 
not consistent or efficient, as disturbances are not independent and identically 
distributed (IID) across firms (Forbes, 2000: 24).  Consequently, the Gauss-Markov 
theorem no longer holds for the OLS estimators and another best linear unbiased 
estimator must be obtained (Hayashi, 2003: 55).     
 
One technique to address these two problems is the generalized least squares (GLS) 
method.  This method, though, requires the use of the sample covariance matrix for 
the disturbances to obtain the so-called feasible GLS (FGLS) estimators (Sefcik and 
Thompson, 1985: 323).  Although the asymptotic properties of FGLS have been 
investigated, little is known about its finite-sample behaviour (Hayashi, 2003: 59; 
Sefcik and Thompson 1985: 323).  Given the small size of the sample, this 
approach may prove not as useful in this particular study.   
 
An alternative is the Sefcik and Thompson (1985) methodology.  This technique 
uses a two-step procedure, which, under several mild regularity conditions, can be 
shown to be equivalent to the three-step procedure described in (1) to (3) (Forbes, 
2000: 23).   
 
This two-step procedure can be written as follows for a particular firm: 
 
it i i mt i t itR α β R γ δ ε= + + +  … (4) 
 
i i iγˆ f Ψ η′= +  … (5) 
 
for   i = 1,2,…,N and t = 1,…,P,P+1,…,P+C  
 
and where 
 
tδ  is a dummy variable equal to 1 during the crisis and 0 otherwise 
iγ    is the parameter representing that part of the return generated by the 
crisis 
iγˆ  is the parameter estimated in (4)  
if ′ : 1 × K is a row vector of the K channel dummy variables for firm i 
Ψ   : K × 1 is the parameter vector  
t index for entire period (both pre-crisis period P and crisis period C) 
while other variables are defined as in (1) to (3). 
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Rewriting (5) as a stacked system for all firms: 
 
γˆ FΨ η= +  … (6) 
 
where 
 [ ]1 Nˆ ˆ ˆγ ,..., γ′ =γ  is a vector containing the γˆ i  for all N firms 
[ ]1 NF f ,..., f′ =  is a matrix containing the if  for all N firms 
 
The γˆ  for all N firms must correspond to the εˆ  in (3) and estimation of such a 
stacked system must render values for Ψ  equal to the estimated values for θ in (3). 
 
So far we have introduced a two-step procedure that renders exactly identical 
estimates as the model in (1) to (3).  Sefcik and Thompson (1985: 323) now 
propose dividing the sample of firms into different portfolios and then using these 
portfolios to estimate how firm characteristics (as measured by the dummy 
variables) affect share returns during a specific event (such as a financial crisis).  
This scaling of the sample from N firms to K portfolios is done using the scaling 
matrix X .  This matrix is obtained from the solution of the OLS normal equations 
as 
 
1ˆ ˆ ˆΨ (F F) F γ X γ−′ ′= =  … (7)  
 
where 
 
X : K × N is a matrix for which each row can be interpreted as an estimated 
weight of the impact of the firm characteristic k. 
 
The weights implied in X can then be used to form K portfolios from the original N 
firms: 
 
K N=R XR  … (8) 
 
where 
 
KR : K × T is a matrix containing the returns for each portfolio 
NR : N × T is the original returns matrix with element R i t   
T  =  P + C is the length of the entire period   
 
The above transformation is possible as X is constructed so that XF I= : K × K 
(Sefcik and Thompson 1985: 324) – implying that the crisis affects each portfolio 
only through the characteristic shared by each portfolio.  The estimated returns KR  
can then be inserted into (4) to calculate the estimated ˆˆα k, 
ˆˆβ k and ˆˆγ k parameters 
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(note the subscript k instead of i – implying that (4) now delivers K, instead of N, 
estimates).  The ˆˆγ k estimates can be shown to be unbiased and consistent estimates 
of the impact of the K firm characteristics on abnormal returns (Sefcik and 
Thompson, 1985).   
 
5.1 Base regression results 
 
We now proceed to the regression results for the base specification.  Three versions 
of the model are shown in Tables 4 to 6.  In Table 4, the model is run using both the 
Sefcik-Thompson method as well as the ordinary OLS method (which ignores the 
IID violations) and variables that may contaminate the crisis transmission variables 
are not controlled for.  Note that the Sefcik-Thompson method provides parameter 
estimates exactly equal to the OLS estimates, because the coefficients for a 
portfolio (as described above in the outline of the method) are weighted averages of 
the individual coefficients for each firm contained in the portfolio (Sefcik and 
Thompson 1985: 324).   Table 4 provide unsatisfactory results for the impact of the 
different transmission channels on abnormal stock returns.  The absence of 
statistically significant transmission channels during the Asian crisis is 
disappointing.  More unsettling, though, are statistically significant, but positive 
effects for the credit and portfolio recomposition channels during the Russian crisis 
and for the competition linkage during the Argentinean crisis.   
 
 
Table 3: Industry groups 
 
Industry   
Group Description 
1 Mining 
2 Financial 
3 Manufacturing & conglomerates 
4 Food & beverages 
5 Retail 
 
Proximate variables, measuring phenomenon not directly observable, are 
necessarily subject to the possibility of information overlaps.  Therefore, a number 
of controlling variables are introduced.  The first controls for a rand hedging effect, 
which could be important during the Argentinean crisis period (following the sharp 
rand depreciation in the later parts of 2001).  This is included in the base regression 
via a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the particular firm has a strong foreign 
earnings base and 0 otherwise.  Secondly, a variable controlling for a “FTSE JSE 
Top 40” effect is included to control for the possibility that firm size could interact 
with the transmission of shocks (Forbes, 2000: 39).  To control for the impact of 
firm size, a dummy variable is added to the base regression to indicate whether a 
firm belongs to the top 40 largest firms or not.  Finally, a set of dummy variables 
for various industry groups is included.  While these variables may capture some of 
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the competitiveness effect, Forbes (2000: 40) notes that their inclusion did not 
affect the result for the competition channel in her study.   Industry group 5 is the 
reference group.  Table 3 summarises the different industry groups. 
 
Table 4: Base regression results for MSCI market index without controlling 
variables 
 
Crisis Asian Crisis:  Phase 1 
Asian Crisis:  
Phase 2 Russian Crisis Argentinean Crisis 
Method Std(b) S-T(b) Std(b) S-T(b) Std(b) S-T(b) Std(b) S-T(b) 
Regression 
Number -1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6 -7 -8 
-0,0002 -0,0002 -0,0002 -0,0002 -0,0179 -0,0179 -0,0022 -0,0022 Constant (-0,0005) 
 
(-0,001) 
 
(-0,0005) 
 
(-0,0018) 
 
(0.0033) 
*** 
(0.0053) 
*** 
(-0,0019) 
 
(-0,0027) 
 
0,0003 0,0003 -0,0027 -0,0027 0,0104 0,0104 0,0086 0,0086 Competition 
linkage (-0,0015) 
 
(-0,0017) 
 
(0.0012) 
** 
(-0,0019) 
 
(-0,0082) 
 
(-0,0073) 
 
(0.0018) 
** 
(0.0037) 
*** 
0,0005 0,0005 -0,004 -0,004 0,0091 0,0091 -0,0051 -0,0051 Credit linkage (-0,0007) 
 
(-0,0008) 
 
(-0,0007) 
 
(-0,0011) 
 
(0.0048) 
* 
(0.0009) 
*** 
(-0,002) 
 
(0.0023) 
** 
-0,0001 -0,0001 0,0016 0,0016 0,0077 0,0077 -0,0022 -0,0022 Portfolio recomposition 
linkage (-0,0011)  
(-0,001) 
 
(-0,0011) 
 
(-0,0012) 
 
(-0,0065) 
 
(0,0641) 
* 
(0,0027) 
*** 
(-0,002) 
 
 
Total Days 309 309 309 309 260 260 269 269 
Crisis Days 60 60 60 60 10 10 19 19 
NOTES: 
(a) Standard errors in parentheses: * is significant at 10% ** is significant at 5% *** is significant at 1% 
(b) Std is the traditional OLS estimates which do not adjust for the cross-correlation in returns or heteroscedasticity 
 
 
Table 5 show the results for the base regression after including the controlling 
variables.  It confirms the earlier suspicion that the proximate variables for the 
transmission channels are reflecting other information.   
 
None of the three channels turns out to be significant for the Asian crisis.  This 
outcome corresponds exactly with results from the Forbes study for the first phase 
of the crisis.  However, as far as the second phase is concerned, the findings by 
Forbes differ significantly from the outcomes of this study.  She finds significant 
competition and portfolio recomposition effects.  The absence of a significant trade 
channel should not be surprising, given that East Asia is not a major trading partner 
of South Africa (representing approximately 5.6% of exports in 20032).    It should 
be noted that the statistically significant and negative returns for companies in the 
                                                        
2Trade statistics from the Department of Trade and Industry (2004) indicate the following East Asian 
nations: Malaysia (0,8%), Korea (1,7%), Taiwan (2,3%), Thailand (1%), Indonesia (0,4%) and the 
Philippines (0,1%). 
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financial sector (during the first phase) does not represent a competition effect as 
South African financial institutions were not competing in East Asia (at least on a 
significant level) and that the negative returns possibly represent an international 
re-evaluation of banks3. While an insignificant competition channel seems 
plausible, the absence of a significant portfolio recomposition channel remains 
puzzling with no easy explanation.     
 
Table 5: Base regression results for MSCI market index with controlling 
variables 
 
Crisis 
Asian Crisis: 
Phase 1 
Asian Crisis: 
Phase 2 
Russian 
Crisis 
Argentinean 
Crisis 
Method S-T(b) S-T(b) S-T(b) S-T(b) 
Regression Number -9 -10 -11 -12 
0,002 -0,003 -0,01 -0,0049 Constant (-0,0015) (-0,0021) (0.0056)* (-0,003) 
-0,0013 -0,0019 -0,0035 0,0044 Competition linkage (-0,0019) (-0,0019) (-0,0079) (-0,0034) 
0,0000 0,0007 0,0045 -0,0022 Credit linkage (0,0000) (-0,0014) (-0,0034) (-0,0026) 
-0,0009 0,0012 0,0027 -0,0014 Portfolio recomposition 
linkage (-0,001) (-0,0012) (-0,0055) (-0,0022) 
0,0000 0,0006 0,0022 0,0014 Rand hedging effect (0,0000) (-0,0011) (-0,0035) (-0,0026) 
0,0000 0,0024 -0,0045 -0,0003 FTSE JSE Top 40 effect (-0,0012) (0,0014)* (-0,0045) (-0,0028) 
0,0001 -0,0005 0,0124 0,0057 Industry group 1 (-0,0016) (-0,0017) (0.0064)* (-0,0038) 
-0,0024 0,0015 -0,0096 0,0024 Industry group 2 (0.0015)* (0.0016) (0.0063) (0.0032) 
-0,0023 0,0001 -0,0092 -0,0015 Industry group 3 (-0,0014) (-0,0015) (-0,0056) (-0,0036) 
-0,001 0,0002 0,0014 -0,0001 Industry group 4 (-0,0014) (-0,0014) (-0,0047) (-0,0029) 
NOTES: 
(a) Standard errors in parentheses: * is significant at 10% ** is significant at 5% *** is significant at 1% 
(b) S-T is Sefcik and Thompson’s method as discussed 
 
 
                                                        
3 A primary cause of the Asian crisis was an overextended banking system with insufficient weighting 
of downside risks (OECD, 1998: 9). 
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For the Russian crisis Forbes finds highly significant competition effects, while our 
investigation does not.  Again, South Africa’s low trade volumes with Russia 
(representing only 0,2% of exports in 20034) may motivate this.  Furthermore, 
mining houses, the industry group with the highest competitive exposure to Russia, 
seem to fare significantly better than other industries during the crisis period.  This 
is probably due to the 1998 rand depreciation5 (IMF, 1998: 34) favouring export-
oriented industries such as mining houses.    
 
Results for the Argentinean case should be read with the definition of the crisis in 
mind.  The Argentinean crisis has been labelled a “spillover” (or “non-contagious”) 
event, as opposed to the “contagious” Asian or Russian crises.  This implies that 
international investors will have had enough time to adjust their portfolios in 
anticipation of an Argentinean collapse.  Our results confirm this classification as 
no transmission channel turns out to be significant. 
 
In summary, no transmission channel appears to be statistically significant for any 
of the crises – in stark contrast with the findings by Forbes.  However, this 
deviation from the results obtained by Forbes should be carefully interpreted – 
given the exclusively South African data sample.  On the one hand, the small size 
of the sample may lead to less correct inferences than the Forbes sample.  
Alternatively, the results may confirm that the impact of a crisis is ultimately 
country-specific and that inferences from country-specific studies may differ from a 
multi-country sample such as the Forbes sample.   
 
5.2 Diagnostic tests  
 
Before proceeding to sensitivity testing, two aspects of the proposed model should 
be confirmed.  Firstly, it is tested whether the proposed firm characteristics 
combined with the controlling variables captures all of the systematic information 
contained in the data.  Put differently, we test whether the residuals in equation (6) 
contain any anomalies.  Secondly, it is investigated whether the residuals from the 
initial equation (equation (4)) are auto-correlated – recall the earlier assumption of 
no autocorrelation (similar to Forbes (2000)).   
 
The residuals of equation (6) are inspected by first attempting a normal quantile 
plot for each crisis event (see Figure 1).  Figure 1 indicates that the general pattern 
of the residuals is consistent with the assumption of normality.  This is confirmed 
by the Jarque-Bera (1987) normality test procedure (Table 6).  The null hypothesis 
of normally distributed residuals cannot be rejected at a significance level of ten 
percent for any of the crisis events.  To confirm that no other anomalies exist, the 
residuals are plotted against the predicted values (see Figure 2).  The horizontal 
bands show that no abnormalities are to be found in the residuals for any of the 
Asian, Russian or Argentinean crises. 
                                                        
4 See trade statistics from the Department of Trade and Industry (2004). 
 
5 The Rand depreciated by twenty percent against the US dollar between end-May and August 1998. 
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Figure 1: Normal quantile-quantile plot of residuals 
 
 
Table 6: Jarque-Bera test for normality 
 
Crisis Jarque-Bera test statistic p-Value# 
Asian Crisis Phase 1 4,186309 0,123298 
Asian Crisis Phase 2 1,021529 0,600370 
Russian Crisis 0,141624 0,931637 
Argentinean Crisis 0,143410 0,930805 
# The Jarque-Bera test is a large sample test and may not be as accurate due to the small size   
    of our sample 
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Figure 2: Scatter diagram of residuals against predicted values 
 
 
Next, tests for the presence of autocorrelation in the residuals of the original 
equation (4) are conducted in the following manner.  First, the Durbin-Watson 
statistic is calculated for each firm separately.  Thereafter, the proportions of firms 
falling inside and outside of the range of 1.574 and 2.426 are obtained.  This is the 
range inside of which the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation (positive or 
negative) cannot be rejected.  It is clear from Table 7 that autocorrelation is not a 
substantial problem for the majority of firms across all crisis events under 
consideration.  This confirms that no adjustment to the model is needed to correct 
for autocorrelation. 
 
In the light of the satisfactory outcome of the selected informal and formal 
diagnostic procedures, the last component of the study, namely the sensitivity 
analysis, is attempted. 
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Table 7: Proportion of firms with Durbin-Watson d statistics# in particular 
ranges of significance 
 
Range## Asia Phase 1 Asia Phase 2 Russia Argentina 
d < 1.574 12,50% 6,25% 6,25% 0% 
1.574 < d < 2.426 87,50% 93,75% 93,75% 100% 
d > 2.426 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Notes:  #    The critical values apply to a 5% significance level (Gujarati 2003: 970)  
            ##   1.574 represents the upper critical value and 2.426 is 4 minus this upper critical value 
 
 
6. Sensitivity testing 
 
The findings in the previous part are based on particular definitions and simplifying 
assumptions.  In order to assess the robustness of the results, a series of sensitivity 
tests are performed. 
 
6.1 Sensitivity test I: a different market index 
 
The market index utilized for the preceding results is the Emerging Market Index 
from Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) in dollar terms, converted to 
South African rand using the daily spot exchange rate.  While a global market 
index, such as the MSCI index, appears to allow abnormal returns from country-
specific studies to be compared, the conversion of the index to local currency 
introduces exchange rate volatility, which differs across countries.  To test the 
sensitivity of inferences for the choice of market index, the JSE All Share Index 
(ALSI) is considered as an alternative. The results are quoted in Table 8 
(controlling variables are included, but not reported).  The outcome confirms the 
robustness of the results, as the statistical significance of the transmission channels 
are unaffected by the new choice of market index.    
 
6.2 Sensitivity tests II: changing crisis durations 
 
All of the previous regressions have assumed a particular time length for the 
different crises.  This necessitates a set of sensitivity tests to establish whether 
results are robust with respect to the assumed time length.  Forbes (2000: 34) 
provides several reasons for pursuing such a duration analysis.  There are no clear 
end dates for the crises – as can be recalled, particular crisis durations were 
assumed.  Second, different transmission channels should be stronger over different 
durations.  The portfolio recomposition channel, for example, should have only a 
short-term impact as it is based on liquidity shortages.       
 
To test whether the base results are affected by these factors, the model is estimated 
with the same starting dates, but with crises lasting for different periods shorter 
than the original duration (see Table 9).   
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Table 8: Base regression results for JSE market index 
 
Crisis Asia1 Asia2 Russian Argentina 
Regression Number -13 -14 -15 -16 
0,0025 -0,0023 -0,0018 -0,0061 Constant (0.0013)* -0,0014 -0,0046 (0.0028)** 
-0,0012 -0,0024 -0,0054 0,0036 Competition linkage (-0,0018) (-0,0018 (-0,0081) (-0,0033) 
-0,0005 0 0,0028 -0,0016 Credit linkage (-0,0012) (-0,0013) (-0,0035) (-0,0025) 
-0,0008 0,0013 0,0075 -0,0002 Portfolio recomposition linkage (-0,001) (-0,0012) (-0,0053) (-0,0022) 
Crisis Asia1 Asia2 Russian Argentina 
Total Days 309 309 260 269 
Crisis Days 60 60 10 19 
NOTES:     
(a) Standard errors in parentheses: * is significant at 10% ** is significant at 5%  
(b) The methodology used is that of Sefcik and Thompson    
 
 
For the first phase of the Asian crisis none of the coefficients are significant for any 
of the time periods of one, two, four, six or eight weeks.  This corresponds with the 
results from Forbes as well as the initial findings for the base duration of 12 weeks.  
Results for the second phase of the Asian crisis are unsettling, as effect of the 
portfolio recomposition channel appears to have a significant positive effect at 
duration of two weeks.  However, the remaining coefficients over all time periods 
are not significant – corresponding with the regression results for the base time 
period.   
 
The Russian crisis is a particularly difficult case as far as variation in the crisis 
period is concerned.  Durations longer than the original time period of two weeks 
cannot be tested for in an unbiased manner.  This is due to the collapse of Long-
Term Capital Management about one month after the start of the Russian turmoil 
(Dungey et al, 2002: 3).  The results for a crisis period of one week, instead of two, 
are similar to the base specification.  
 
Findings for the non-contagious crisis in Argentina are more interesting.  
Significant and positive competition effects turn up for crisis lengths of one and 
three weeks.  Even after controlling for a rand hedging effect, it may well be that 
the dramatic fall of the rand, occurring during the Argentinean crisis, had a 
significant impact on the stock performance of mining companies (who were the 
only South African companies with a significant South American exposure).  
Surprisingly, the effect of the credit channel appears to be significant and negative, 
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although more robust evidence is required before making any large-scale 
inferences. 
 
Table 9: Sensitivity tests: Varying crisis period length (with controlling 
variables not indicated here) 
 
Crisis 
 
 
Constant 
 
 
Competition 
Linkage 
 
Credit linkage 
Portfolio 
recomposition 
linkage 
Asian Crisis: Phase 1         
0,0056 -0,0066 -0,0009 -0,0011 1 week (0.0032)* (-0,0042) (-0,0027) (-0,0023) 
0,0046 -0,0095 0,0001 0,0003 2 weeks (-0,0045) (-0,0059) (-0,0037) (-0,0032) 
0,0052 -0,0031 0,0000 -0,0008 4 weeks (0.0023)** (-0,003) (-0,0019) (-0,0016) 
0,0031 -0,0015 0,0001 -0,0019 6 weeks (-0,0019) (-0,0025) (-0,0016) (-0,0012) 
0,0026 -0,0018 -0,0002 -0,0016 8 weeks (-0,0017) (-0,0022) (-0,0014) (-0,0012) 
0,002 -0,0013 0,0000 -0,0009 12 weeks (base) (-0,0015) (-0,0019) (0,0000) (-0,001) 
Asian Crisis: Phase 2        
0,0042 -0,001 -0,0038 0,0031 1 week (-0,0047) (-0,0053) (-0,0038) (-0,0033) 
0,0008 -0,0006 0,0000 0,0062 2 weeks (-0,0032) (-0,0037) (-0,0026) (0.0024)*** 
-0,0081 -0,0024 0,0064 -0,0005 4 weeks (0.0031)*** (-0,0029) (-0,0022) (-0,0019) 
-0,0012 -0,0036 0,0001 -0,0004 6 weeks (-0,0027) (-0,0025) (-0,0019) (-0,0016) 
-0,0034 -0,0028 0,0007 0,0002 8 weeks (-0,0024) (-0,0022) (-0,0017) (-0,0014) 
-0,003 -0,0019 0,0007 0,0006 12 weeks (base) (-0,0021) (-0,0019) (-0,0014) (-0,0011) 
Russian Crisis         
-0,0028 0,0181 0,0112 -0,005 1 week (-0,0077) (-0,0108) (-0,0047) (-0,0074) 
-0,01 -0,0035 0,0045 0,0027 2 weeks (base) (0.0056)* (-0,0079) (-0,0034) (-0,0055) 
Argentinean Crisis        
-0,0141 0,0116 -0,0056 0,0015 1 week (0.0055)** (0.0064)* (-0,0049) (-0,0043) 
-0,0125 0,0053 -0,005 0,0015 2 weeks (0.0039)*** (-0,0046) (-0,0035) (-0,003) 
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-0,006 0,0092 -0,0057 -0,0018 3 weeks (0.0034)* (0.0038)** (0.0029)** (-0,0025) 
-0,049 0,0044 -0,0022 -0,0014 4 weeks (base) (-0,003) (-0,0034) (-0,0026) (-0,0022) 
  
NOTES 
(a) Standard errors in parentheses: * is significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1% 
(b) Only the Sefcik-Thompson estimates are reported 
(c) The starting date for each crisis is kept constant, while ending dates are varied 
 
 
6.3 Sensitivity test III: redefining transmission channels 
 
The final sensitivity test is related to the dummy variables approximating the 
transmission channels.  Alternative proxies, however, are not easy to construct due 
to the small size of the dataset.  Narrower SIC classification seems out of place for 
a sample of 32 companies and is not attempted.  As far as an alternative credit 
channel proxy is concerned, the ratio of debt to total assets, instead of the ratio of 
debt to equity, is utilized.  As Table 10 shows, a redefinition for this key variable 
does not yield an outcome different from the base specification.   
 
Table 10: Sensitivity test: Redefining proximate variables (with controlling 
variables not indicated here) 
 
Crisis Asia1 Asia2 Russian Argentina 
0,0021 -0,0029 -0,0198 -0,0136 Constant (-0,0015) (-0,002) (0.0056)*** (0.0063)** 
-0,0008 -0,0021 -0,009 0,0019 Competition linkage (-0,0018) (-0,0019) (-0,084) (-0,0036) 
-0,0003 0,0008 0,0039 -0,0019 Credit linkage (-0,0012) (-0,0015) (-0,0035) (-0,0022) 
-0,0006 0,0000 0,0163 0,0082 Portfolio recomposition linkage (-0,0013) (-0,0015) (0,0056)** (-0,0059) 
       
Total Days 309 309 260 269 
Crisis Days 60 60 10 19 
     
NOTES:     
(a) Standard errors in parentheses: * is significant at 10% ** is significant at 5%  
     and *** is significant at 1% 
(b) The methodology used is that of Sefcik and Thompson 
 
 
The portfolio recomposition channel is the more interesting case.  Forbes proposes 
that a highly liquid stock should rather be identified as one with non-zero returns 
for at least three quarters of the trading days prior to the crisis.  A dummy variable, 
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separating highly and less liquid shares, is then constructed.  The Asian and 
Argentinean results are similar to the base results.  The findings for the Russian 
crisis, however, indicate a significant, but positive, portfolio recomposition effect.  
The proxy proposed by Forbes seems to capture some other information not 
relevant to this investigation.  Specifically, the proxy appears to isolate those stocks 
with very few days of zero returns.  Stocks exhibiting this characteristic are either 
performing exceptionally well or doing very poorly.  Consequently, the alternative 
proxy does not measure liquidity better than the base proximate variable – which 
considers the volume of shares traded versus total shares outstanding. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
Given the rough proxies and small sample of companies, it appears that trade and 
financial linkages do not offer compelling explanations for the impact of 
international crises on larger South African firms and, ultimately, the South African 
economy.  While financial and trade linkages may be important in explaining crisis 
transmission on a global level, these linkages may have been less important when 
limited to a South African study.   
 
The absence of systematic financial and trade channels could support the notion 
that international crises have been transmitted to this country due to investor 
herding behaviour, rather than weak South African macro-economic fundamentals.  
More research in this field of “behavioural finance” will have to be undertaken.    
 
However, as financial integration continues and information asymmetries 
disappear, it is probable that fundamental economic linkages will become more, 
and not less, important as explanations for the transmission of future financial 
crises to South Africa.  This, together with massive stock-market datasets that are 
becoming available, bode well for future crisis research to be based on 
microanalysis.  
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APPENDIX: LIST OF COMPANIES* 
 
? Anglo American plc 
? Richemont Securities AG 
? SABMiller plc 
? Sasol Ltd 
? Standard Bank Group Ltd 
? Firstrand Ltd 
? Anglogold Ashanti Ltd 
? Absa Group Ltd 
? Sappi Ltd 
? The Bidvest Group Ltd 
? Imperial Holdings Ltd 
? Nampak Ltd 
? Pretoria Portland Cement Company Ltd 
? Nedcor Ltd 
? MTN Group Ltd 
? RMB Holdings Ltd 
? Liberty Group Ltd 
? Venfin Ltd 
? Investec Ltd 
? Impala Platinum Holdings Ltd 
? Pick n Pay Stores Ltd 
? Naspers Ltd 
? Tiger Brands Ltd 
? Amalgamated Beverage Industries Ltd 
? Barloworld Ltd 
? Shoprite Holdings Ltd 
? Dimension Data Holdings plc 
? Edgars Consolidated Stores Ltd 
? JD Group Ltd 
? AVI Ltd 
? Reunert Ltd 
? Afrox Healthcare Ltd 
 
*   Names of companies as at year-end 2003 or earlier. 
 
 
